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Illiquidity Premium Works Only When Liquidity Isn't Needed

By Stjepan Kalinic | February 25, 2026, 2:50 PM

On February 18, Blue Owl Capital (NYSE:OWL) halted redemptions in Blue Owl Capital Corp II, a retail-oriented private credit vehicle that had offered quarterly liquidity. It was, arguably, the first real stress test for private credit's long-promised "democratization."

What followed — merger plans, valuation gaps, asset sales, and finally a decision to keep redemptions shut while returning capital over time — rattled not just one fund but confidence in a $1.8 trillion market. Analysts responded by downgrading the stock and slashing the price target.

Still, the episode is not a scandal, but rather a structural reveal. The illiquidity premium that characterizes private credit only exists if investors agree to be illiquid. Retail investors, by design and by temperament, do not.

If Investors Stay Put

Private credit's appeal rests on a simple bargain. Borrowers pay a higher interest rate — the illiquidity premium — to avoid the daily mark-to-market scrutiny of public bond markets. In exchange, lenders lock up their capital and accept that they cannot exit on demand.

For an institutional investor, such a trade makes perfect sense. Insurers and pension funds have long time horizons and predictable liabilities. Their structures typically lock up capital for years. Thus, they can tolerate temporary valuation opacity since their liquidity needs aren't reactive. Illiquidity premium is a reward for patience.

However, retail investors operate differently. Their time horizons are shorter and more variable. Cash needs are unpredictable. Headlines, market swings, social media narratives – all of them influence portfolio decisions. The behavioral component also matters. When told liquidity might be limited, individuals are more likely to rush for the exit than to assess underlying credit quality calmly.

Blue Owl's situation illustrates the point. Its retail-focused vehicle offered quarterly redemptions capped at 5% of the assets. That approach is a compromise between daily liquidity and multi-year lockups.

But, with mounting concerns around software lending, AI disruption, and broader credit standards, redemptions surged. The very existence of a gate became a signal to get out faster.

Retail Contradictions

The deeper problem is the asset–liability mismatch embedded in semi-liquid private credit funds. The assets, such as directly originated loans, are inherently illiquid. They trade infrequently and often at negotiated prices. The liabilities — retail fund shares — promise periodic liquidity at net asset value.

Such promise is manageable in calm markets, but when sentiment shifts, it becomes destabilizing.

In Blue Owl's case, a proposed merger of the retail vehicle into a publicly traded affiliate exposed a valuation gap between private Net Asset Value (NAV) and market pricing. Investors realized that the "stable" marks of private loans could translate into a material discount in a public setting. 

Rationally, they sought to redeem at stated NAV before any reset. When redemptions were constrained, anxiety intensified.

The Natural Border

Broader industry trends only amplify the tension. Aggressive lending to private equity-backed software companies now faces uncertainty as artificial intelligence reshapes business models.

"Many private equity firms were buying software companies at very high valuations — not at nine times earnings, but at 20 or even 40 times," Antoine Flamarion, co-founder of Tikehau Capital, said according to Bloomberg.

Valuations in private markets remain less transparent than in public ones. The opacity that once made returns appear uncorrelated becomes suspect when doubts arise about what assets would fetch in a forced sale. When the perceived gap between stable NAVs and realizable market prices widens, the illiquidity premium morphs into a liquidity risk. And retail capital, by nature, is more sensitive to that risk.

None of this means private credit is doomed. Institutional capital still values the diversification and yield advantages of direct lending. Funds with properly matched lockups and liabilities can continue to thrive.

But, it is now increasingly obvious that, no matter how carefully engineered, retail participation lies beyond the natural border of such expansion.

Image: Shutterstock

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